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DOORS, ENVELOPES, AND ENCRYPTION: THE
UNCERTAIN ROLE OF PRECAUTIONS IN
FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
Lee Tien *
INTRODUCTION
We conventionally understand the Fourth Amendment as securing
our privacy against arbitrary or unreasonable government searches.'
Searches of the home usually require a judicially issued warrant based
on probable cause that evidence will be found. Searches that infringe
privacy by capturing the content of communications, like eavesdrop-
ping on conversations and wiretapping of phone calls, are (at least in
theory) tightly regulated.
But does the Fourth Amendment secure a right to protect our pri-
vacy? We normally produce privacy by taking precautions: We
whisper to confidants or confide only in people we trust, enclose let-
ters in envelopes, close bathroom doors, and draw curtains. If I
wanted to make an untraceable, anonymous phone call, I would prob-
ably use a coin payphone. We take for granted that we may and can
do these things to protect our privacy against prying ears or eyes. Do
we actually have a right to do these things?
Think for a moment of the various ways that the law could restrict
precautions-taking in order to make surveillance easier. The govern-
ment could directly target precautionary acts, such as requiring us to
use postcards or subjecting us to criminal liability if we use envelopes.
The government could restrict the resources needed for precautionary
acts, like envelopes (paper or digital) or doors.
Precautions are crucial to modern Fourth Amendment search law.
As the Supreme Court said in Katz v. United States:
[A] person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind
• Lee Tien is a Senior Staff Attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which special-
izes in free speech law, including intersections with intellectual property and privacy law. This
Article grew out of a presentation made during the Symposium: Privacy and Identity: Construct-
ing, Maintaining, and Protecting Personhood, held on March 13, 2004 at DePaul University Col-
lege of Law.
1. This Article does not address Fourth Amendment seizures or searches incident to seizures,
such as arrests.
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him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely enti-
tled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not
be broadcast to the world. 2
At the very least, Katz means that one may be able to create a legally
cognizable reasonable expectation of privacy by taking a precaution
like closing a door. In short, the possibility of Fourth Amendment
privacy has been closely tied to the taking of privacy precautions ever
since Katz.3 But what privacy precautions are actually possible, and
how many of these precautions are protected, is unclear. After all,
Katz could only "shut the door behind him" because there was a door
to close. 4
The Supreme Court understood that when Katz closed the phone
booth door, he created a temporary zone of personal privacy that soci-
ety recognizes. What if there had been no door? How much did the
door really matter, doctrinally speaking?
In United States v. Muckenthaler,5 the defendants, relying on Katz,
contended that the arrest warrant was based on unconstitutionally
gained evidence: A police officer positioned himself so as to overhear
parts of a telephone conversation. 6 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit distinguished Katz partly because the de-
fendant "was talking on a telephone attached to a post around which
were three other telephones. .. and none of them was enclosed."'7 As
a result, the police officer "was in a position where another individual
would normally be expected to be," and anyone "in that position was
likely to overhear portions of a conversation at any of the other
telephones." 8
The example of a phone booth door illustrates a simple point: One
usually needs some resource, like a door, wall, or envelope, in order to
produce privacy in the first place. Taking those resources away-
eliminating the ability to take precautions-can be a very effective
way to destroy privacy because "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
2. 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (emphasis added).
3. See, e.g., Melissa Arbus, Note, A Legal U-Turn: The Rehnquist Court Changes Directions
and Steers Back to the Privacy Norms of the Warren Era, 89 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1737 (2003)(stating that Katz stands for the principle that Fourth Amendment protection is triggered when
people "take everyday, conventional measures to maintain their privacy").
4. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
5. United States v. Muckenthaler, 584 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978).
6. Muckenthaler, 584 F.2d at 243.
7. Id. at 245.
8. Id.; see also State v. Constantino, 603 A.2d 173, 176 (N.J. Super Ct. 1991) (stating that the
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he "was talking on a public pay
phone ... [that] was not enclosed by a glass or metal booth and was located in a public place").
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the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 9
Even without outright criminalization or resource prohibition, the
government could make it harder for us to take precautions-or it
could make the precautions we do take less effective. Relatively little
attention has been paid to the right to take privacy precautions. 10
Fourth Amendment search law is mostly about government action
that violates our personal or informational boundaries or is directed at
collecting information. Banning envelopes clearly reduces our pri-
vacy, but is not obviously a search in itself. Diluting or discouraging
precautions looks even less like a search. 1'
This Article addresses the question: To what extent do we have the
right to protect our privacy? At one level, the answer is obvious.
There must be some right to take precautions. After all, one often
does not even have a reasonable expectation of privacy without pre-
cautions, whether preexisting (like the architecture of phone booths
and their doors) or created in real time (like whispering). Taking pre-
cautions is generally a necessary, if not always sufficient, condition for
enjoying Fourth Amendment privacy. 12 It seems intuitively clear that
the Fourth Amendment would be violated if the government enacted
a law banning phone booth doors the day after Katz was decided. If
the law says that we have no reasonable expectation of privacy unless
we take precautions, then we ought to be able to take those necessary
precautions. 13
This Article attempts to unpack some of the conceptual issues sur-
rounding precautions and the Fourth Amendment. My thesis is that
the Fourth Amendment restricts state action that unduly burdens peo-
ple's ability to take precautions, much as the First Amendment re-
stricts state action that unduly burdens speech. This Article further
argues that there is a constitutional cluster of rights surrounding the
taking of privacy precautions. We have a privilege to take privacy pre-
cautions, a claim against the government that it may not interfere in
certain ways with actions under that privilege, and an immunity
9. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
10. For a useful discussion of precautions and privacy, see Arbus, supra note 3. See also Wil-
liam Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 32-63
(2002) (contrasting the "vigilance" and "forbearance" approaches to privacy).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (involving installation of an un-
monitored beeper in an automobile). The Court stated that this "created a potential for an
invasion of privacy, but we have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of
privacy constitute searches for purposes for the Fourth Amendment." Id.
12. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (Fourth Amendment protection
requires that "a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.").
13. What a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (footnotes omitted).
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against government attempts to reshape that privilege. This combina-
tion of privilege, claim, and immunity may be referred to as the "pre-
cautions cluster-right."
Legislation that bans or discourages precautions or their use must,
therefore, be subject to significant constitutional scrutiny. I do not
assume or argue as a normative matter that we must take precautions
in order to be protected by the Fourth Amendment.1 4 As discussed
below, the Fourth Amendment, however, places great importance
upon those precautions we do take.
The precautions cluster-right raises one major question. Does it in-
clude an immunity against the government? In other words, does the
government lack the power to deprive us of the right to take precau-
tions? Some argue that the government has a right to an effective
search and therefore the power to restrict precautions that would in-
terfere with that right.15 I argue that we must have such an immunity
because the well recognized right that the government may not search
us unreasonably does not make sense unless we also have the precau-
tions cluster-right. 16
Part II briefly analyzes precautions and introduces the issue in
somewhat more detail, including how the Supreme Court has ad-
dressed precautions, how precautions relate to privacy, what kinds of
precautions there are, and whether they are all the same. It also sets
forth a rough analytical framework for thinking about the Fourth
Amendment and precautions. Part III attempts to ground the precau-
tions cluster-right doctrinally and normatively. Part IV further details
what the right might actually entail, by discussing the ideas of crippled
encryption and mandated "tappability" in the context of the Commu-
nications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA).
II. WHY PRECAUTIONS MATTER AND WHAT THEY ARE
In common privacy practices, privacy is a function of privacy pre-
cautions. We put letters into envelopes. We promise to keep others'
14. For instance, the fact that we do not defend against technologies that can "see" through
walls should not constitute "knowing exposure" of in-home activities. Christopher Slobogin,
Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing
Technological Surveillance, 86 MiNN. L. REV. 1393, 1411 (2002) ("Members of our society should
be constitutionally entitled to expect that government will refrain from any spying on the
home-technological or otherwise-unless it can demonstrate good cause for doing so.").
15. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869,
880-82 (1996).
16. Given the complexity of the subject, I do not pretend that this analysis is complete. I
believe, however, that we will never approach a coherent analysis of Fourth Amendment privacy
without a framework for thinking about precautions.
876 [Vol. 54:873
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secrets. Even in a crowded room, a couple may produce some conver-
sational privacy by whispering.
Many scholars have written about the relation of precautions to the
existence of a Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. 17 But a very different question-whether we have any kind of
constitutional right to take those precautions in the first place-has
hardly been addressed. 18 I will focus on the following four issues here,
mostly in a descriptive vein: (1) How the Supreme Court has viewed
precautions and the Fourth Amendment; (2) the kinds of precautions
that we use to protect our privacy; (3) the ways that government might
interfere with precautions and precautions-taking; and (4) an analyti-
cal framework for thinking about rights.
A. The Doctrinal Significance of Precautions-
Why Precautions Matter
Fourth Amendment search law is mostly about searches, which are
"governmental inspections of activities and locations in which an indi-
vidual has a reasonable expectation of privacy from observation." 19
As a result, to determine whether there has been a search, we usually
ask: Does the person have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and if
so, is the government's search behavior reasonable?
Whether one has any expectation of privacy (reasonable or not),
often depends on whether one takes precautions (consciously or not),
which in turn depends on whether one can actually do So. 2 0  Many
17. See, e.g., Thomas Clancy, Coping with Technological Change: Kyllo and the Proper Analyt-
ical Structure to Measure the Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 72 Miss. L.J. 525, 532-35
(2002) (arguing that the Court has "too readily made privacy expectations contingent on tech-
nology," as well on "observability"); David Harris, Superman's New X-Ray Vision and the Fourth
Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 18 (1996) ("Fourth
Amendment protection depends not only on how an individual protects his privacy, but where
and in what situation he does so."); Ramsey Ramerman, Comment, Shut the Blinds and Lock the
Doors-Is That Enough?: The Scope of Fourth Amendment Protection Outside Your Own Home,
75 WASH. L. REV. 281, 292-96 (2000).
18. See Heffernan, supra note 10, at 90-93 (discussing the role of precautions in social pri-
vacy); Arbus, supra note 3, at 1743-45. Ironically, a recent discussion of precautions explains
how government can reshape the social environment to promote precautions against crime, in-
cluding ways of negating some privacy precautions. See generally Neil Katyal, Architecture and
Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002).
19. Sherry Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness", 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1643 (1998).
20. Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar
Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 392 (1997). Professor
Slobogin argues that "[e]ven an area normally associated with an expectation may not be enti-
tled to Fourth Amendment protection if no efforts are made to keep it private." Id. (citing
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 298 (1987) (holding that a flashlight inspection of a barn
was not a "search" because police were able to see through netting material)). See generally
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Fourth Amendment cases have turned on whether the defendant took
"normal precautions to maintain his privacy. '21
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been less than clear about
what makes a precaution "normal" or even effective. 22 Some com-
mentators have even argued that the Court's view of precautions is
that they are not effective unless total or perfect. 23 Such a belief that
it is necessary for an individual to avail oneself of all available privacy
precautions developed from a series of landmark Supreme Court
cases in which the Court held that defendants who subjectively be-
lieved they had taken effective precautions, actually had failed to ab-
solutely guard against prying eyes.
The first classic example in which an individual failed to take neces-
sary privacy precautions is the "abandoned garbage" case, California
v. Greenwood.24 In Greenwood, a policeman received a tip that
Greenwood may have been involved in drug trafficking, so he asked
the trash collector to collect Greenwood's garbage bags and give them
to him.25 The officer then searched the garbage without a warrant and
found evidence of drug use.26
The Supreme Court held that even though Greenwood may have
expected that the police would not inspect his garbage, that expecta-
Sherry Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some
Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002).
21. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) ("So far as the normal sidewalk traffic was
concerned, this fence served that purpose, because respondent took normal precautions to main-
tain his privacy." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (stating that "the precipitous nature of the transaction hardly supports a
reasonable inference that petitioner took normal precautions to maintain his privacy").
22. Arbus, supra note 3, at 1739 (arguing that courts "expect[ I precautions far beyond the
bounds of what society would consider reasonable and rel[y] on the absence of such precautions
as a justification for finding that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy"
(footnote omitted)); see also Wayne LaFave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 301-04 (1986). Professor LaFave criticizes the
"knowing exposure" doctrine that "there is a dramatic difference, in privacy terms, between
revealing bits and pieces of information sporadically to a small and often select group for a
limited purpose and a focused police examination of the totality of that information regarding a
particular individual." Id. at 304.
23. See, e.g., Daniel Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Pri-
vacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1133 (2002) ("The Court's new conception of privacy is one of
total secrecy. If any information is exposed to the public or if law enforcement officials can view
something from any public vantage point, then the Court has refused to recognize a reasonable
expectation of privacy"); Arbus, supra note 3, at 1745 ("Katz merely looked to the conventional
steps taken by the individual, rather than requiring that individual to take perfect precautions,"
but post-Katz cases require "individual precautions to be nearly perfect in order to afford consti-
tutional protections.").
24. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
25. Id. at 37.
26. Id. at 37-38.
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tion was not reasonable because the bags are "readily accessible to
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the
public."2 7
Another example is California v. Ciraolo,2 8 where police received a
tip that Ciraolo may have been growing marijuana in his backyard. 29
Unable to inspect Ciraolo's backyard from the ground because of the
six-foot outer fence and ten-foot inner fence, the officers secured an
airplane and flew over Ciraolo's backyard without a warrant.
30
The Supreme Court found that while Ciraolo had exhibited a sub-
jective expectation of privacy in the contents of his backyard by en-
closing it with two fences, that expectation was not objectively
reasonable. 31 The Court explained, "In an age where private and
commercial flight in the public airways is routine," Ciraolo could not
reasonably expect that the marijuana growing in his backyard was
protected from aerial observation.
32
On the other hand, Arizona v. Hicks33 suggests that the precautions
sufficient to create a Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of
privacy can be quite trivial. In Hicks, police entered Hicks's apart-
ment after a bullet was fired through Hicks's floor, injuring a man in
the apartment below. 34 One of the officers noticed expensive stereo
equipment that seemed out of place in the apartment, which led him
27. Id. at 40. The standard critique of cases like Greenwood is that they "ignore[ ] the actual
probability of surveillance by the general public" and "fail[ ] to recognize the difference between
public observation and police surveillance." Arbus, supra note 3, at 1747; see also Colb, supra
note 20, at 127-28. The Supreme Court "treated a person who takes the risk that something
might occur as having invited the materialization of that risk." Id. Thus, "permitt[ing] the of-
ficer to act as though the garbage, which was in fact safely enclosed within an opaque bag, had
actually been strewn about by all manner of errant creatures in the neighborhood." Id. at 128
(footnotes omitted). Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Greenwood, argued:
The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open and rummage through the
containers does not negate the expectation of privacy in their contents any more than
the possibility of a burglary negates an expectation of privacy in the home; or the possi-
bility of a private intrusion negates an expectation of privacy in an unopened package;
or the possibility that an operator will listen in on a telephone conversation negates an
expectation of privacy in the words spoken on the telephone.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 54.
28. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
29. Id. at 209.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 213-14.
32. Id. at 215. Indeed, the Court even cast doubt on whether Ciraolo had exhibited a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy. Id. at 211 ("Yet a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from
the eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus.").
33. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). The Supreme Court has more recently construed Hicks as a "home"
case, in which "all details are intimate details." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
34. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
to suspect that the equipment was stolen.35 On his hunch, and without
a warrant, he moved some of the equipment so he could see and re-
cord the serial numbers. 36
The Supreme Court found that a search occurred because the of-
ficer moved the equipment: "[T]aking action . . . which exposed to
view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce
a new invasion of [Hicks's] privacy unjustified by the exigent circum-
stances that validated the entry. '37 Further, the Court reasoned that
the distinction between looking at something and moving it in order to
see something hidden is of great consequence in Fourth Amendment
analysis.38 The Court explained, "a truly cursory inspection-one that
involves merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without
disturbing it-is not a 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes, and
therefore does not even require reasonable suspicion. '39 The Court
reasoned that treating even a minor disturbance as less than a full-
blown search would undermine the principle that the "plain view"
doctrine "may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges." 40
Bond v. United States4t points in the same direction, and further
suggests that the Supreme Court may be shifting its view of how pre-
cautions relate to reasonable expectations of privacy. In Bond, the
defendant was traveling across the country on a bus, which made a
regular stop at a permanent U.S. Border Patrol checkpoint in Texas.42
The Border Patrol agent squeezed the passengers' luggage stored in
the overhead compartments. 43 When he squeezed Bond's soft-sided
green canvas bag, he felt a "brick-like object" inside the bag.44 Bond
consented for the agent to open his bag, which revealed a brick of
methamphetamine wrapped in duct tape and rolled in a pair of
pants.45
Because Bond consented to the agent's opening of the bag, the key
issue was whether the agent's physical manipulation of the bag was an
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 325.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 328.
40. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
41. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
42. Id. at 335.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 336.
45. Id.
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unlawful search.46 The Supreme Court found that Bond had exhibited
the requisite subjective expectation of privacy by using an opaque bag
and by placing that bag in the luggage compartment directly above his
seat. 47 Moreover, the Court held that Bond's privacy expectation was
reasonable .48
Bond is significant for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court did
not require extraordinary privacy precautions. Bond could have pro-
tected himself by using hard-sided luggage, much as Ciraolo could
have protected himself against aerial observation by covering his en-
tire backyard.49 Second, the Court did not assess the privacy risk in
terms of the techniques of the "snoop," as it did in Greenwood.50 In-
stead, the Court distinguished ordinary handling of his bag from "ex-
ploratory" squeezes: "[A] bus passenger clearly expects that his bag
may be handled," but "[h]e does not expect that other passengers or
bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an explora-
tory manner."'51 The approach in Bond is thus faithful to the Court's
point in Katz that what a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
52
Hicks and Bond are also interesting because the precautions in both
cases were in a sense unconscious, or at least not deliberate. Hicks
almost certainly did not deliberately conceal the serial numbers of the
stereo equipment; rather, it probably just happened to be the case that
the serial numbers were in a place that could not be seen. Had Bond
anticipated "exploratory" squeezing by law enforcement, he probably
would have used hard-sided luggage.
Some readers may think that .these are not examples of precautions-
taking because the privacy protection was more by chance than purpo-
sive protection. At this stage in the analysis, however, it makes sense
to think that precautions need not be deliberately taken and can be
46. Id.
47. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39.
48. Id. at 338.
49. Id. at 343 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that "the traveler who wants to place a bag in a
shared overhead bin and yet safeguard its contents from public touch should plan to pack those
contents in a suitcase with hard sides").
50. Noting that "scavengers and snoops" often rummage through garbage left on the side-
walk, the Supreme Court used the behavior of "snoops" as its privacy baseline and concluded
that the defendants had exposed their garbage to the public even though the garbage was in an
opaque bag. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 n.4 (1998); see also Heffernan, supra
note 10.
51. Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39.
52. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (citations omitted).
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contextual or architectural. 53 On this view, Hicks and Bond suggest
that one can have a reasonable expectation of privacy by virtue of a
simple, preexisting precaution that passively protects privacy.
Another reason that precautions are important is that precautions
can provide actual, as opposed to legal, privacy. In our time, the cov-
erage of the Fourth Amendment as well as other privacy laws is un-
clear, especially when new technologies are at issue.54 Thus,
precautions can protect our privacy even when it is not clear that the
law does-or when it is clear that the law does not. Under current
law, for instance, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
one's movements in public.55 A person might choose to wear a mask
in public to avoid public video surveillance, or use a "blocker chip" to
guard against surveillance of radio frequency identification tags.
Thus, the creation of actual privacy is significant for those activities
that are under-protected or unprotected by the law.56
53. The most obvious reason to include contextual precautions comes from thinking about
how the government might interfere with them. The government could require equipment man-
ufacturers to put serial numbers on every exposed surface so that the police would not need to
move the equipment. Alternatively, the serial numbers could be stored in radio-frequency iden-
tification (RFID) chips that law enforcement could access with a sensing device. As we live in
more of a panopticon, these architectural precautions are less likely to be effective.
54. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the
Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1350-56 (2002) (discussing technol-
ogies for searching and protecting electronic communications); Slobogin, supra note 20, at
440-50 (discussing video surveillance, telescopic cameras, location-tracking devices, thermal de-
tection devices, and weapons- and contraband-detection technologies).
55. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (involving beeper tracking of an
automobile). The Supreme Court stated:
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. When [codefendant]
Petschen traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direc-
tion, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he
exited from public roads onto private property.
Id.; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public.., is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection" (citations omitted)). Professor LaFave has trench-
antly criticized Knotts:
Only an army of bystanders, conveniently strung out on the route and who not only
"wanted to look" but also wanted to pass on what they observed to the next in line,
would-to use the language in Knotts-"have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the
police." Just why the disclosure of these fragments to an imaginary line of bystanders
must be treated as a total surrender of one's expectation of privacy concerning his
travels is never explained.
LaFave, supra note 22, at 303-04 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282) (footnote omitted).
56. Importantly, these kinds of threats are posed by private parties as well as by the govern-
ment. See generally, e.g., Patricia Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1375 (2004); Solove, supra note 23. Indeed, as Professor Solove argues in detail,
the government routinely takes advantage of information gathered by private actors. Id. at
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B. What Kinds of Precautions Are There?
Precautions can be classified in several different ways, depending
on the purpose of the classification. Precautions can be classified on
the basis of legal distinctions, physical versus social mechanisms, or
passive versus active precautions.
1. Distinguishing Precautions Based on Their Legal Force
From a legal perspective, there are three kinds of precautions. First,
some precautions are needed even to have a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Phone booth doors represent this kind of precaution under
Katz.57 Second, some precautions enhance existing privacy expecta-
tions. For example, I might not only lock the door to my house but
also destroy incriminating files. Alternatively, I might encrypt my
phone calls so that even if my phone were tapped, the wiretapper
would have difficulty understanding what I say. Finally, some precau-
tions do not create a reasonable expectation of privacy, but nonethe-
less provide practical or actual privacy. One might, for instance, speak
in a foreign language as protection against casual over-hearers.
58
2. Physical Versus Social Precautions
One may also classify precautions based on whether they are prima-
rily physical or social. 59 Many precautions work physically or techno-
logically, by actually blocking sensory access. For example, a person
may cover an unsightly scar with one's clothes or may close a door.
Or a person may encrypt his or her phone calls and e-mail, making it
much harder for unauthorized parties to understand the communica-
tion even if they can capture the electronic signals.
1090-92. Solove also argues that "[tihe government is increasingly contracting with private sec-
tor entities to acquire databases of personal information." Id. at 1095 (footnote omitted).
57. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
58. In United States v. Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 1999), members of a narcotics con-
spiracy took privacy precautions by speaking in Spanish when they were around non-conspira-
tors. Id. Unfortunately, they discussed their plans in the presence of a government informant
who recorded the conversation and later translated it into English. Id. The court rejected the
argument that that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversations, saying
that defendant "exposed his statements by speaking in a manner clearly audible by the inform-
ant. His hope that the informant would not fully understand the contents of the conversation is
not an expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. at 1183 (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted).
59. See, e.g., Heffernan, supra note 10, at 44-45 ("The system of privacy hinges on a series of
convention-based expectations as to how people will behave: expectations about how they will
respond to closed doors, sealed envelopes, markings that something is confidential, and so on.").
See also ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 41-44 (1971) (discussing everyday use of
boundary markers to define or lay claim to personal territories).
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Other precautions are more social, appealing to or relying on social
conventions or practices. One might share a secret with someone on
the condition that he or she executes a nondisclosure agreement. One
who closes the door to a bathroom stall expects as a matter of social
convention that others will not peer over the top or through any
opening.60
Some existing case law supports recognizing the legal effectiveness
of social precautions. Perhaps the most obvious support comes from
third-party consent cases.61 For instance, in United States v. Matlock,62
the Supreme Court found that the proper question is whether the
third party "possessed sufficient common authority over or [pos-
sessed] other sufficient relationship to the premises" such that one
could validly admit the police to the premises.63 Co-tenants could
therefore agree that certain parts of a house are not common areas
and instead belong exclusively to one person. 64 If so, it should also be
possible for other private agreements to provide effective precautions.
Most of the time our precautions are mixed-they work both physi-
cally and socially. Closing a door normally only makes it harder to
eavesdrop. In Katz, for instance, the government was able to listen to
the conversation by using a powerful microphone to amplify the spo-
60. As Heffernan notes,
[i]n the typical restroom, closing the door to a toilet stall does not wholly limit exposure
.... Someone standing outside a stall can still peer through the slit that remains be-
tween the closed door and the beam to which it can be bolted. Does that mean that
privacy conventions do not protect the person inside? Certainly not.
Heffernan, supra note 10, at 49. Heffernan more generally argues that our social privacy norms
are grounded "in an expectation of forbearance on the part of others-that is, in an expectation
that others will restrain their curiosity with respect to those aspects of life that are essential to
defining and maintaining individual identity," while cases like Greenwood and Ciraolo fit a "vigi-
lance model" of privacy "that requires people to be constantly alert to the way in which others
can intrude on their lives." Heffernan, supra note 10, at 6.
61. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (holding that where visitors were
present in a third party's home "for a[n illegal] business transaction and were only in the home a
matter of hours[, the visitors] ... had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment");
Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (protecting the privacy of an overnight guest staying in a
host's apartment); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (concluding that searching a
hotel room without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that one who
engages a hotel room gives implied permission to personnel such as maids, janitors, or repairmen
to enter to perform their duties); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1961) (con-
cluding that searching a house occupied by a tenant violated the Fourth Amendment, despite the
fact that the landlord had authority to enter the house for some purposes).
62. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
63. Id. at 171. But see Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S.
248 (1991). These cases diminish the role of social precautions by focusing on the third party's
"apparent authority."
64. While it is true that this is ultimately a legal, not a factual question, it is hard to imagine
that facts about the third party's relationship to the search target could be completely irrelevant.
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ken words. 65 But closing a door also invokes a well-known privacy
convention that we use to send privacy signals to others, and Katz
rests largely on this convention's force.
An obvious issue here is the strength of the precaution. Notably,
there is a modal problem. A glass phone booth door blocks most
sound, but not light. But the fact that anyone could open the phone
booth door does not change the fact that the phone booth user has
created a socially recognized temporary zone of privacy by closing the
door. Additionally, there is a competence problem. Locks prevent
the ordinary person from intruding, but not the locksmith or an exper-
ienced burglar. Therefore, depending upon one's level of expertise in
frustrating the effectiveness of a specific precaution, it might not take
much effort to defeat that precaution. The container cases, as well as
Katz, 66 suggest that the more important issue is the force of the social
component of the precaution. 67 For example, "a traveler who carries
a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted
scarf [may] claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from offi-
cial inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attach6
case."
68
Furthermore, a precaution might block only one mode of intrusion.
Katz remained visible to the public after closing a transparent phone
booth door. But the force of the social privacy convention about
closed doors made it irrelevant that Katz could be physically seen; he
sought to exclude the uninvited ear, not the uninvited eye.69 Thus,
judicial recognition that a precaution generates a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy contemplates that the precaution need not be total, nor
block all modes of sensory perception.
70
65. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
66. In Katz, the Court did not merely rest on the fact that the phone booth door had been
closed; it also referred to "the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication." Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
67. See, e.g., Bond, 529 U.S. at 337-39 (finding that bus passengers have a reasonable expecta-
tion that others will not, "as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner" and that
a government agent's "probing tactile examination" of the passenger's soft-sided luggage "far
exceeded the casual contact" that would reasonably have been expected).
68. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (rejecting a constitutional distinction be-
tween "worthy" and "unworthy" containers).
69. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (rejecting the government's argument that Katz lacked privacy
because "the telephone booth ... was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after
he entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside").
70. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that even when Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) agents lawfully possessed boxes of films, and the labels on the boxes gave them probable
cause to believe that the films were obscene and that their shipment in interstate commerce
violated federal law, warrantless viewing of the films was a "search of the contents of the films"
that unreasonably invaded the owner's constitutionally protected privacy interest. Walter v.
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3. Active Versus Passive Precautions
A third distinction is between active and passive precautions.
Often, we rely on "normal" features of the status quo for privacy. A
couple picnicking in the woods, believing that they are alone, may de-
cide to have an intimate conversation. Similarly, people may do
things in the dark that they would not do in a well-lit setting.71 Here
again, the Supreme Court has not sent consistent signals.
In Smith v. Maryland,72 the defendant argued that he had a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed from his home
phone because the phone company tracked long distance phone calls
but not local calls. 73 The Supreme Court disagreed, saying that "[t]he
fortuity of whether or not the phone company in fact elects to make a
quasi-permanent record of a particular number dialed does not ...
make any constitutional difference."74 Yet in Katz, telephone users
were accorded Fourth Amendment protection even though such users
ordinarily take no precautions against the phone company's ability to
record conversations that take place over the phone company's
system. 75
Katz and Smith also illustrate how the precautions issue will fre-
quently involve third parties because we often rely on third parties for
our privacy.76 Unfortunately, the Court has not respected such reli-
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980): see also id. at 652 n.2 (noting that the films could not "be
examined successfully with the naked eye").
71. In an early Fourth Amendment search case, the Supreme Court found that using artificial
light to penetrate darkness was not a search. See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927). In
that case, a searchlight revealed contraband on the deck of a boat. Id. at 561; see also Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (holding that looking into the interior of a car with the aid of
a flashlight is not a search).
72. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
73. Id. at 745. For purposes of my argument, I assume that Smith knowingly relied on this
phone company practice.
74. Id. The Court stated:
Under petitioner's theory, Fourth Amendment protection would exist, or not, depend-
ing on how the telephone company chose to define local-dialing zones, and depending
on how it chose to bill its customers for local calls. Calls placed across town, or dialed
directly, would be protected; calls placed across the river, or dialed with operator assis-
tance, might not be. We are not inclined to make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amend-
ment, especially in circumstances where (as here) the pattern of protection would be
dictated by billing practices of a private corporation.
Id. at 745.
75. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 746-48 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that telephone companies
have equipment to record or overhear conversations).
76. Such "third-party precautions" should not be viewed as a separate class of precautions,
because so much of our lives is now recorded in "extensive digital dossiers." Solove, supra note
23, at 1084 ("Detailed records of an individual's reading materials, purchases, diseases, and web-
site activity enable the government to assemble a profile of an individual's finances, health, psy-
chology, beliefs, politics, interests, and lifestyle. This data can unveil a person's anonymous
886
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ance on third parties in the past thirty years. 77 For instance, in United
States v. Miller, the Court found that bank customers have no expecta-
tion of privacy in the papers they fill out when conducting transactions
with their banks because they assume the risk that any such informa-
tion might be disclosed to the government.78 Yet in older third-party
consent cases, the Court refused to leave privacy "secure only in the
discretion of their landlords" or in the "unfettered discretion of an
employee of the hotel."
79
In summary, our ordinary social expectations of privacy frequently
turn on our use of or reliance on "normal" precautions, which often
mix physical, social, active, and passive elements. Fourth Amendment
law, however, has been deeply conflicted about how to handle the
many types of precautions used in everyday life, and especially reluc-
tant to recognize predominant social conventions.
C. How the Government Might Interfere with Precautions
Just as we can categorize precautions, we can categorize govern-
ment interferences with precautions and with precautions-taking. The
two most obvious ways are: To make the act of precautions-taking ille-
gal 80 and to ban a resource essential to precautions-taking, like phone
booth doors. In both cases, the problem is that if we cannot take pre-
speech and personal associations." (footnotes omitted)). Perhaps more fundamentally, rejecting
third-party precautions as precautions ignores the importance of relationships in our social pri-
vacy norms. See Mary Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of
Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1593 (1987) ("Much of what is important in human life
takes place in a situation of shared privacy. The important events in our lives are shared with a
chosen group of others; they do not occur in isolation, nor are they open to the entire world.").
77. See Colb, supra note 20, at 153 (tracing Supreme Court doctrine since Katz and criticizing
the "equation of small and large intrusions upon a particular expectation of privacy" for "al-
low[ing] government officials to treat as knowingly exposed to the world (and thus to the police
as well) . . . those things that have been knowingly exposed to any third party").
78. 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). As Heffernan notes, customer privacy is an integral part of
banking:
Banks are physically arranged so as to make it possible for customers to avoid broad-
casting to the public-at-large the nature of their transactions. Tellers' cages are con-
structed so that a customer can turn her back to the queue and carry out her business.
Automatic teller machines envelop a customer, creating barriers to snoops in the rear
who might want to find out about the customer's transactions. And, most important,
banks do not provide members of the public-at-large with information about their cus-
tomers; indeed, no bank could stay in business if it did so. Customers thus rely on their
banks to keep financial information private.
On the Miller Court's account, this consistent pattern of confidentiality vis-A-vis that
public-at-large counts for nothing in the calculation of privacy interests given the gov-
ernment's subpoena power over banks.
Heffernan, supra note 10, at 87.
79. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964).
80. Because this technique of interference is so obvious, I do not discuss it further.
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cautions, we often will have no reasonable expectation of privacy and
the Fourth Amendment simply will not apply.
The government's interference with precautions-taking is not lim-
ited exclusively to physical resources like doors, luggage, and enve-
lopes. The government can also interfere with resources that are not
physical at all. For example, knowledge or information is also a re-
source with which the government can interfere. Knowledge of a pri-
vacy threat is a resource for precautions-taking; we are unlikely to
take precautions if we are not aware that our privacy is threatened. If
the government installs highly conspicuous video surveillance cameras
in some public places, people who do not like to be photographed
might avoid those places. They would have no reason to avoid those
places if the cameras were hidden.
Also, knowledge or information can be a resource for actually tak-
ing precautions. Even if people know that their Internet activities
may be monitored, they cannot protect themselves against such moni-
toring unless they know how to use privacy enhancing technologies
like anonymous remailers, anonymizing proxies, or encryption.
Less obviously, the -government could make it harder or less attrac-
tive to take precautions. Instead of making it unlawful to use enve-
lopes, it could tax them or otherwise raise the price of using
envelopes. Instead of installing conspicuous video surveillance cam-
eras,81 it could conceal them.82
The government could also cripple precautions.8 3 The government
might impose mandatory data retention requirements on banks or
communications providers, which would defeat private arrangements
81. The example of public video surveillance provides an additional insight into precautions.
Some precautions are "normal," while others are abnormal. Arguably, public video surveillance
exploits the fact that precautions like wearing a ski mask on the streets of San Francisco are
abnormal.
82. Notice requirements for public surveillance have been urged in the literature. See, e.g.,
Slobogin, supra note 20, at 442-43 (arguing that "government searches that affect large groups of
people should be mediated through the public process"); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy:
Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J. 213, 297-98
(2002) (arguing that public notice of public video surveillance should be required).
83. Defeating or overcoming precautions is not the same as crippling or interfering with them.
Part of what is interesting about precautions is that defeating precautions often does not seem as
bad as interfering with them. When I was a child, my mother and I would often converse in
public about private family matters-but in Chinese. We created privacy, but we were vulnera-
ble to others who understood Chinese. The government could defeat or overcome this precau-
tion by employing Chinese speakers. Or the government could interfere with the precaution by
banning Chinese.
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to purge records. 84 It might require or create incentives for "recover-
able encryption," which would build a backdoor into otherwise "un-
breakable" encryption.85  Alternatively, it might require that
communications providers design and use equipment that permits
ready government access to communications content and identifying
information, like phone numbers and internet protocol (IP)
addresses. 86
This last mode of interference overlaps with the knowledge issue
mentioned earlier. It is obvious that covert surveillance relies on the
target's ignorance of the surveillance. The general point is that people
are much less likely to take precautions when they do not know about
a privacy threat. Crippling precautions that are internal to complex
technological systems, like the phone system or the Internet, may well
weaken privacy with little publicity or understanding. Unfortunately,
because the Supreme Court has failed to analyze precautions in any
depth, these sorts of government interferences with precautions are
invisible to modern Fourth Amendment law. In the remainder of this
Article, I attempt to construct a framework for thinking about a
Fourth Amendment right to take precautions.
D. An Analytical Framework for Thinking about Rights
This section analyzes the Fourth Amendment's search jurispru-
dence using Professor Judith Jarvis Thomson's analytical framework
for thinking about rights.87 Thomson's framework, which I review
briefly here, helps analyze the various components of complex rights.
Thomson argues that people have four kinds of rights: claims, privi-
leges, powers, and immunities.88 A claim is a familiar kind of right; it
is always correlated with another entity's duty.89 If I have a claim that
someone gives me $100, then that individual has a correlative duty to
84. See generally Catherine Crump, Note, Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity, and Accounta-
bility Online, 56 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2003) (discussing the constitutionality of mandatory data
retention).
85. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995).
86. See generally Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the Digi-
tal Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949 (1996).
87. See generally JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990). I do not defend
Thomson's approach to rights, I merely adopt it. My analysis will be subject to the same criti-
cisms as hers, but I assume that her analysis has sufficient theoretical currency to make my own
analysis plausible. Thomson's analysis is an attractive candidate for this task because, although it
is a moral theory of rights, it is partly inspired by a seminal work in legal literature: WESLEY
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919).
88. THOMSON, supra note 87, at 40.
89. Id. at 41 ("X's having a claim is equivalent to Y's being under a duty").
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give me $100. A privilege is also familiar; it is defined by the lack or
absence of a duty. Thus, if I have a privilege to close my door, then I
have no duty to anyone not to close my door.
Privileges, however, are weak in a way that is probably unfamiliar
because they do not by themselves entail any claims. 90 Thomson uses
a simple example of a person, C, who owns a salad but gives another
person D permission to eat it.91 D now has a privilege to eat the
salad-but does that mean that C cannot also eat the salad? Or that C
cannot decide to put the salad away before D has actually eaten it?92
Thomson's answer is no: A privilege is only the lack of a duty.93
Because D has a privilege to eat C's salad, D does not wrong anyone
in doing so. But D's privilege is not a claim, which means that no one
has a corresponding duty of any kind. Thus, D's privilege does not
mean that C has a duty to allow D to eat it; it only means that C has
no ground for complaint if D does eat the salad. In short, the mere
privilege to do something does not mean one has a claim to be able to
do it.
Powers and immunities are relatively unfamiliar species of rights. 94
The easiest way to understand them is through the familiar idea that
constitutional rights may not be altered by legislative or executive ac-
tion.95 In Thomson's terms, this aspect of rights is analyzed in terms
of powers and immunities. One who owns a typewriter has power
over the typewriter by virtue of ownership: He or she can unilaterally
give the typewriter to someone else. More generally, "a power is an
ability to cause, by an act of one's own, an alteration in a person's
rights, either one's own rights or those of another person or persons,
or both."'96
90. Id. at 47 ("No privilege entails any claim.").
91. Thomson views property ownership as including a range of rights, including powers to
alter others' rights. Id. at 57-58. As owner of the salad, C has the power to allow others to eat
it.
92. Id. at 51.
93. Id. at 44, 51 (explaining that the salad hypothetical can be understood as C's having said:
"Eat the salad, if you can," or "[y]ou have my license to do so, but I don't agree not to interfere
with you.").
94. As Thomson notes, "[p]eople do say such things as that a person who owns a piece of
property has a right to give it away or sell it," but they are "likely to mean to be ascribing a
power." THOMSON, supra note 87, at 59.
95. The judiciary's role in altering the meaning of constitutional rights is beyond the scope of
this Article.
96. THOMSON, supra note 87, at 57. Thomson further distinguishes "large-scale" and "small-
scale" powers: Large-scale powers, like those associated with outright property ownership, are
abilities to make large-scale alterations in people's claims and privileges. Id. at 58. A "small-
scale" power is a situation in which X makes a promise to Y to do something, so that Y has a
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Immunities correlate to powers as duties correlate to claims.97 That
is, "for X to have an immunity against Y just is for Y to lack a power
as regards X. '' 98 For example, the federal Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) generally provides that any person may obtain disclosure
of agency records, subject to several statutory exceptions. 99 Congress,
however, has the power to amend the FOIA and add new exceptions
or to enact statutes that satisfy FOIA's criteria and thereby permit
agencies to refuse to disclose additional agency records. Therefore,
unlike constitutional rights, statutory rights are not immune against
the power of the legislature.100
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF PRECAUTIONS
The Fourth Amendment restricts state action that unduly burdens
people's ability to take precautions, much as the First Amendment
restricts state action that unduly burdens speech. We have a right to
lock our doors, go into a secure area to talk, or encrypt our e-mail in
order to prevent the government, or anyone else, from gaining access
to our things, our space, or our communications. We have a related
right to challenge the government if it elects to unduly interfere with
our precautions-taking. More precisely, I argue that we have a cluster
of "rights" against the government with regard to privacy precautions.
This cluster of rights has three aspects: (1) The privilege to take pre-
cautions; (2) a claim that the government may not interfere with our
acts of taking precautions; and (3) an immunity for both the privilege
and the claim.
A. Privileges, Claims, and Immunities: The Cluster of Rights Upon
Which the Government May Not Trample
First, we have a privilege of action. In other words, we have a privi-
lege to take precautions to protect our privacy. We have no duty to
refrain from whispering to prevent overhearing; conditioning disclo-
sure of information to others on their promise to keep the information
confidential; going from the sidewalk into one's home to converse pri-
claim against X that X has to do something. Id. If I release one from one's promise to me, I
relinquish that claim. Id.
97. Id. at 59.
98. Id.
99. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000).
100. See, e.g., THOMSON, supra note 87, at 282 (discussing the importance of immunities asso-
ciated with "our rights to a voice" in government action and "immunity to state action in the
absence of a voice in it"). Thomson's analysis of rights is intended as a general framework, and
does not address the distinction between strongly protected constitutional rights, like First and
Fourth Amendment rights, and statutory rights.
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vately; enclosing letters within envelopes to make it harder for letters
to be read.
Second, we have a claim that the government may not interfere
with this privilege, all other things being equal; the government has a
duty toward us that it not interfere with our taking the kinds of pre-
cautions mentioned above. This duty is not "absolute." Having this
claim does not necessarily cause such government interference to be
automatically wrong.101 But it does mean that absent special circum-
stances, government interference with precautions-taking would in-
fringe our claim, and even when such infringement is permissible or
would be right, there are things the government may nevertheless
have a duty to do, such as seek a release in advance or compensate us
later for harms caused by the infringement.10 2
Third, we have an immunity with respect to this privilege and claim.
The government does not have indiscriminate power to take away the
privilege or the non-interference claim. In other words, because there
is no search without a reasonable expectation of privacy, the govern-
ment should not be able to evade the Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
tion of unreasonable searches by preventing one from being able to
create the needed reasonable expectation of privacy.' 0 3 Although the
government can take away the privilege and claim, it can only do so
by enacting legislation that withstands "exacting" scrutiny or by
amending the Constitution.1 04
At the heart of this argument is the concept of precautions-taking.
My key point is that our constitutional privacy, secured mainly by the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
101. Much of Thomson's book argues that claims are not absolute. See id. at 79-122. Instead,
our having a claim means that the person who holds the correlative duty (in this case, the gov-
ernment) is significantly constrained in his or her actions. Id. at 123 (stating that "it is only in
special circumstances that Y may permissibly fail to accord the claim; other things being equal, Y
ought to accord it").
102. Id. at 96.
103. Interference with precautions should be subject to strict scrutiny given that "[tihe secur-
ity of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusions by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment-is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). The Court,
however, has not used the rubric of strict scrutiny in evaluating the Fourth Amendment chal-
lenges to statutes or regulations. In some cases, the Court uses the concept of "reasonableness."
California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 67 (1973) (deciding a challenge to regulations
imposing reporting requirements on banks in terms of "reasonableness"). In other cases, the
Court has evaluated the statute in light of the Fourth Amendment's underlying historical pur-
pose of repudiating the British practice of general warrants. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58
(1967) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant be particular in its
description of places to be searched and things to be seized repudiated general warrants and
findings that the state's eavesdropping statute was too "indiscriminate").
104. See infra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
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seizures, cannot be disassociated from precautions-taking. 05 Privacy
depends on context, and if we do not have the right to create that
context for ourselves, there ultimately will be no "breathing space" for
privacy.106 Put slightly differently, unless the Constitution is inter-
preted as securing the precautions cluster-right on at least a constitu-
tional par with the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
then the latter right is illusory.
B. The No-Search Claim and the Government's Duty
The Fourth Amendment secures an individual right against the gov-
ernment. Specifically, this right is:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
107
Textually, the Fourth Amendment secures two basic rights: A general
right against "unreasonable" searches and a more precise right that
any search pursuant to a warrant be based on an affirmation of proba-
ble cause'0 8 and further that the warrant itself particularly describe
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 10 9
Warrants are often unnecessary, but many warrantless searches still
require probable cause.1t °
105. See generally Colb, supra note 19; Heffernan, supra note 10; Arbus, supra note 3.
106. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) ("Because First Amendment freedoms
need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specific-
ity." (citation omitted)).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
108. See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). In Garrison, the Court stated that
"[b]y limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is prob-
able cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its
justifications." Id. Consequently, "the scope of a lawful search is defined by the object of the
search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Katz, the Court held that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions." Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (footnotes omitted).
109. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 560 (2004). The Court stated that
unless the particular items described in the affidavit are also set forth in the warrant
itself (or at least incorporated by reference, and the affidavit present at the search),
there can be no written assurance that the Magistrate actually found probable cause to
search for, and to seize, every item mentioned in the affidavit.
Id.
110. For instance, the so-called "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment permits
warrantless searches of almost any vehicle for which probable cause to search exists. David
Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and Search Any Car at Any Time, 47
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In Thomson's terms, we have a right against the government that it
cannot search us unreasonably. 11 Thomson calls this kind of right a
"claim," and we can say that the Fourth Amendment secures the no-
search claim.
Claims are always accompanied by correlative duties."t 2 In this
analysis, because we have a claim that the government cannot unrea-
sonably search us, the government has a corresponding duty not to
engage in unreasonable searches. 113 Of course, the government may
search us if it complies with the warrant requirement and its many
exceptions. The best way to think about the ways that searches are
permissible flows from Thomson's point that claims are not absolute,
using the familiar notion that one may infringe a right without violat-
ing it.' 4 A violation of a claim, then, is a wrongful infringement of a
claim. In the case of the Fourth Amendment right against govern-
ment searches, government searches generally infringe the no-search
claim, but properly executed, warranted searches based on probable
cause (and other justified searches) do not violate that claim.115
C. Powers, Immunities, and the No-Search Claim
Fourth Amendment rights are constitutional rights. Thus, just as
the government cannot decide that we lack the First Amendment right
to free exercise of religion, the government cannot unilaterally decide
that we lack the right against government searches. In my view of
Thomson's framework, our Fourth Amendment rights include some
immunity against governmental alteration of the no-search claim." 6
In summary, the Fourth Amendment apparently secures to individ-
uals a right (claim) against the government that it cannot search us,
and the government has a correlative duty not to search us. When the
government searches, it infringes that right. But the Warrant Clause
and various other rules and exceptions 1 7 provide that not all infringe-
VILL. L. REV. 815, 817 (2002) (chronicling the expansion of the automobile exception since Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
111. See THOMSON, supra note 87, at 37-60.
112. "[E]very claim is a right that an entity has against an entity. One cannot have a claim that
is a claim against nothing.... This issues from the fact that ... X's having a claim is equivalent to
Y's being under a duty." Id. at 41.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 122.
115. It is not clear whether defining the right this way-as opposed to a right against unjusti-
fied searches-makes a difference to the analysis.
116. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
117. Thus, in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Court found that a warrantless
search of an automobile was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as it was based on
probable cause "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be
[Vol. 54:873
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ments are violations." 8  Searches, for example, justified by properly
issued particular warrants based on probable cause, do not violate our
Fourth Amendment right against government searches.' 19 Our Fourth
Amendment rights, moreover, include a strong immunity against the
government; the government lacks the power to alter the claim (ex-
cept by constitutional amendment).
D. The Precautions Privilege
Under the Fourth Amendment, we have a no-search claim and an
immunity against the government in regard to the no-search claim,
subject to the government's warrant power, the exercise of which ne-
gates our no-search claim and the government's no-search duty in a
particular fact situation.
But government restrictions on precautions and precautionary be-
havior raise problems for this level of analysis because it is hard to
think of these restrictions as "searches." Providing back doors into
encryption or banning phone booth doors facilitates searches or can
transform what would otherwise be a search into a non-search, but
neither seems like a search. If the Fourth Amendment is to protect
precautionary behavior, we need a different approach. So I further
suggest that we also have the following rights: A privilege to take pre-
cautions to protect our privacy, a claim against the government that it
not interfere in certain ways with that privilege, and immunities
against the government for both the privilege and the claim.
As we have seen, taking privacy precautions can be as simple as
whispering or putting a letter inside an envelope. In Thomson's
framework, these kinds of actions are generally comprehended as
privileges. 120 Katz had a privilege to close the phone booth door be-
hind him, precisely because he had no duty not to close the door.
121
I think there is no serious dispute that the precautions privilege ex-
ists, at least as an aspect of our basic liberty of action. We may lock
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Id. at
153. The Court has since expanded the automobile exception greatly. See, e.g., Moran, supra
note 110.
118. For instance, restraining a person's freedom to move away is a Fourth Amendment
seizure, but whether such a seizure actually violates the Fourth Amendment turns on whether
the seizure is "reasonable." See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) (explaining that
detentions are less intrusive than arrests, and that the reasonableness analysis requires weighing
"the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure ad-
vances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty").
119. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
120. See THOMSON, supra note 87, at 43-45.
121. Id. at 46 (stating that "a privilege is merely the lack of a duty"). In other words, Katz had
no legal obligation to leave the phone booth door open.
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our doors, hide our papers, or even destroy our things. We have no
general duty to preserve things or communications so that a lawful
government search will be fruitful. As Thomson puts it, "you have a
claim against me that I not enter your house? You need only lock
your doors and windows, and that is on any view something it is per-
missible for you to do."'1 22 Thus, taking precautions is part of our gen-
eral set of privileges.
E. The Claim to Non-Interference and Its Immunity
Privileges by themselves are weak because they do not entail any
claim, and thus entail no correlated duty. As previously described, the
mere privilege to take precautions does not include any kind of claim
against the government. The real question is whether we have more
than a mere privilege to take precautions.
In Thomson's salad example, C gave D the privilege to eat C's
salad, which meant that D could eat the salad without doing anything
wrong to C.123 But C did not promise not to interfere with D's at-
tempt to eat the salad. For instance, C could have locked the salad in
a box without authorizing D to open the box. In other words, privi-
leges in themselves do not entail a claim of non-interference. But C
could also give D the claim that C not interfere with D's eating the
salad. As Thomson puts it, "in the typical case in which you give
Bloggs permission to eat your salad, you give him more than merely a
privilege, as regards you, of eating your salad: you surely also give him
a claim against you to your noninterference with his eating of it."'124
In short, what we colloquially think of as a freedom or "liberty" to
act is actually a privilege to do something combined with some claim
of non-interference. 125 Thus, I argue we have a claim against the gov-
ernment that it should not interfere with our privilege to take precau-
tions. We have a privilege to close phone booth doors, and the
government has a duty not to interfere, whether by ordering us not to
or by causing doors to be removed.
Furthermore, because the claim to non-interference is rooted in the
Fourth Amendment, and is thus of constitutional dimension, one more
122. Id. at 111.
123. Id. at 51.
124. Id. at 50. Thomson further explains that this claim to non-interference is not the same as
a claim "to his actually eating the salad, or even to your assistance in eating it." Id. You do not,
on this account, do anything wrong if you do not provide a plate or fork. THOMSON, supra note
87, at 150.
125. Id. at 54 (stating that "the liberty to do such and such contains all of those privileges ...
and claims to noninterference ... whose possession is necessary and sufficient for being at liberty
to do the such and such").
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component is added-an immunity against ordinary government ac-
tion. The mere privilege to take precautions could be taken away; the
added components of a non-interference claim and an immunity
against the government are what give our standard constitutional lib-
erties their force.' 26 As Thomson puts it, "At the heart of the right to
liberty ... is not privileges and claims, but immunities."
1 27
F. Grounding the Non-Interference Claim and Its Immunity
I have asserted that we have a claim to non-interference with our
privilege to take precautions, and that both the privilege and the claim
are immune from government alteration. The remaining question
pertains to our immunity with respect to this privilege and claim,
which corresponds to the government's lack of a power to alter the
non-interference claim.' 28 Why should we recognize a strong right to
take precautions?
There are at least two normative arguments for this immunity. The
clearest argument is the simple "argument from equivalence"-that
the privilege to take precautions and its associated claim to non-inter-
ference is functionally equivalent to the no-search claim. 129 Our con-
stitutional rights are in theory immune unless the courts exercise their
power of judicial review or the Constitution is amended. Because all
Fourth Amendment rights are constitutional rights, ordinary legisla-
tive or executive action cannot alter them.130
But whether we have Fourth Amendment rights in any given situa-
tion depends on whether the government engaged in a "search;" that
is, whether the government infringed a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.131 Under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, reducing
precautions can mean diminished or even extinguished privacy expec-
tations, and thus weak or no Fourth Amendment rights. 132 Thus, to
the extent that government action interferes with precautions needed
126. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 282.
128. Id. at 59 (explaining that the meaning of X's having an immunity against Y is simply that
Y lacks a power as regards X).
129. See supra Part II.A (explaining how Fourth Amendment protection often depends on
taking precautions).
130. Given that "the Fourth Amendment, at its most fundamental level, is designed to protect
people from the government," the legislature should not be able to change our Fourth Amend-
ment rights. Clancy, supra note 17, at 549.
131. See, e.g., Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39 ("The warrantless search and seizure of the garbage
bags ... would violate the Fourth Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable.").
132. See supra notes 107-127 and accompanying text.
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to have Fourth Amendment rights at all, there should be constitu-
tional limits on such action. 133
Once the relationship between precautions and searching is recog-
nized, then all the reasons to limit government searches support the
right to take precautions and to limit encroachment on those precau-
tions. 134 Privacy is, of course, the main reason. 135 But the Fourth
Amendment is also animated by the general goal of the Constitu-
tion-"to define and limit governmental power.' 36 This separation
of powers goal is at special risk from executive or legislative interfer-
ence with precautions because of the agency problem, that is "protect-
ing the people generally from self-interested government. 1 137 We
should expect that absent external restraint, law enforcement agencies
would seek to interfere with privacy precautions. 38
The weakness of this argument is that it may under-protect us
against future threats. The example of banning phone booth doors
works because it is clear that the government is depriving us of some-
thing we already have. It does not work as well if we do not yet have
133. Arguably, the Fourth Amendment's textual reference to "persons, houses, papers, and
effects" provides minor support for some precautions privilege because it assumes at least two
kind of precautions: keeping or doing things within the boundaries of one's body or home. See
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982). For example, Justice Stevens stated:
For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same
guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a
toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim an equal
right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive
with the locked attachd case.
Id. (footnote omitted).
134. In many cases, of course, objections can be based on other constitutional rights. For
instance, an obvious obstacle to criminal investigation is the fact that many of our conversations
are never recorded. Imagine a law requiring total data retention of every conversation, phone
call, and e-mail. Moreover, all such communications would be turned over to the government
for secure safekeeping. While such a scheme would obviously violate the First Amendment, it
should also be found to violate the Fourth Amendment.
135. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 584 (1974) (stating that "the primary object of the
Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy").
136. Shih Ray Ku, supra note 54, at 1337. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)
(noting that the prohibition of general warrants was one of the central purposes of the Fourth
Amendment).
137. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1177 (1991).
Professor Amar argues generally that the Bill of Rights is concerned more about protecting "the
society against the oppression of its rulers" than protecting individuals and minorities against
majorities. Id. at 1132-33 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
138. See United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) ("The Fourth Amend-
ment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested
magistrates . . . The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unre-
viewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence
and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech." (footnote omitted)).
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that reasonable expectation of privacy because we cannot as strongly
argue that the action deprives us of anything. Unfortunately, the
question of a reasonable expectation of privacy often arises where
new technologies are concerned.'
39
The second, more forward-looking argument is that the government
should not be free to manipulate our expectations. A familiar notion
in constitutional law is that preferred constitutional liberties, like free-
dom of speech, function to preserve "spheres of autonomy" based on
private ordering.140 The danger of government action aimed at pre-
cautions and precautions-taking is that it distorts the "natural" evolu-
tion of social privacy practices, which are supposedly the source of
reasonable expectations of privacy. 141 Government interference with
precautions reorders the private realm, and in the case of Fourth
Amendment privacy, may well be strategic action intended to thwart
precautions that might, like doors and envelopes, become perceived as
necessary for the meaningful exercise of our Fourth Amendment
rights. 142
Oddly, Smith v. Maryland lends support to this argument. In Smith,
the Supreme Court admitted that Katz's reasonable expectation test
would fail in cases where the government had "conditioned" individu-
139. See generally, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 86 (discussing how the uncertainty surrounding
new communication technologies like e-mail led to weak protection for non-content attributes of
communications).
140. See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality
Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 647, 656-64 (2002)
(discussing notions of autonomy in First Amendment law); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1490 (1989) ("Preferred constitutional liberties generally
declare desirable some realm of autonomy that should remain free from government
encroachment.").
141. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
argued in dissent:
Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that
translate into rules the customs and values of the present. Since it is the task of the law
to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely
recite the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them
upon society.
Id.; see generally Lee Tien, Cheap Surveillance, Essential Facilities, and Privacy Norms, 1999
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10 (arguing that widespread public surveillance can distort social evolution
of privacy norms); Lee Tien, Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms, 9 INT'L
J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1 (Autumn 2004), at http://www.ijclp.org/Cy-2004/pdf/LeeTien-ijclp-
paper.pdf.
142. A closely related point is that the government should not be able to ban or inhibit pre-
cautions, because we have a right to protect ourselves from other people. This argument may
not seem to be based on the Fourth Amendment, since other people are not the government.
But the social system of privacy norms that grounds "reasonable" privacy expectations depends
on precautions and precautions taking, and government interference with precautions will un-
duly affect this social system. I am indebted to Professor Christopher Slobogin for this point.
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als' subjective expectations of privacy in a way "alien to well-recog-
nized Fourth Amendment freedoms," and that in such situations "a
normative inquiry" would be appropriate. 143 If this is so, a normative
inquiry should be appropriate when the government attempts to shape
or "condition" individuals' objective expectations of privacy by shap-
ing the resources needed to assert them. 44
Kyllo v. United States also supports, although obliquely, some right
to take precautions. 145 In Kyllo, the Court found that the use of a
thermal imaging device to interpret heat emanations from the home is
a search requiring a warrant based on probable cause. 146 In so hold-
ing, the Court expressly noted that thermal imaging technology is "not
in general public use,"'147 suggesting that current social conditions
should play a significant role in determining Fourth Amendment
rights. 148 If so, then the government should be limited in its ability to
manipulate those conditions.
To some extent, this approach departs from the standard individual-
istic view of Fourth Amendment rights149 by recognizing that society
itself-not just atomistic individuals-has an interest in Fourth
Amendment rights. 50 But if privacy expectations are grounded in so-
cial practices, 15' then there ought to be some legally cognizable inter-
est in protecting those practices against deliberate government
143. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979).
144. Government interference with precautions obviously implicates many non-Fourth
Amendment issues. For instance, restrictions on encryption technology that apply to the publi-
cation of scientific information raise First Amendment issues. See, e.g., Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d
481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a law professor's intended Internet publication of encryp-
tion source code in a law school course website was protected by the First Amendment).
145. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
146. Id. at 40.
147. Id. at 34. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, aerial surveillance infringed no objective
privacy expectation because it used "a conventional, albeit precise, ... camera commonly used in
mapmaking." 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). The Court, however, also stated that, "highly sophisti-
cated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public ... might be constitutionally
proscribed absent a warrant." Id. For extensive analysis of the "not in general public use" con-
cept, see Slobogin, supra note 14.
148. Indeed, the notion of "general public use" could be viewed as Fourth Amendment pro-
phylaxis about precautions. If a surveillance technology is not in general public use, few people
will know about the threat, and they will not take relevant precautions or precautions may not
be commercially available.
149. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (stating that "Fourth Amendment
rights are personal rights").
150. See Coombs, supra note 76; Donald L. Doernberg, "We the People": John Locke, Collec-
tive Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52,
105-06 (1985).
151. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (one source of "legitimate" Fourth
Amendment privacy expectations is "understandings that are recognized and permitted by soci-
ety"); see generally Christopher Slobogin & Joseph Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Pri-
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interference. After all, "[p]art of the definition of personal privacy is
what might be called social or communal privacy, the interest people
have in the security of their arrangements for sharing what they have
with others." 152
IV. CONCRETE EXAMPLES EMBODIED IN THE COMMUNICATIONS
ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT
Suppose there is a right to precautions in the manner that I have
suggested. In practical legal terms, what would it look like? This Part
focuses on the idea of crippled encryption and the idea of mandated
"tappability" embodied in CALEA.
Since the advent of the telephone, law enforcement has exploited
two features of electronic communications. First, electronic communi-
cations are carried by wires or in over-the-air signals, channels that
are easy to "tap" or intercept because they are covertly and remotely
accessible. 153 Second, for many years there was no electronic
equivalent of an envelope; the signals, once accessed, were open to
view.154 Unsurprisingly, wiretapping became a useful tool for law
enforcement. 155
In the early 1990s, the federal government concluded that techno-
logical changes could make wiretapping less useful to law enforce-
ment. 156 On the one hand, the technology of encryption was
vacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society", 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993).
152. James Boyd White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study
of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 165, 217.
153. See, e.g., COMPUTER SCI. AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BD., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
CRYrOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 2 (Kenneth W. Dam & Her-
bert S. Lin eds., 1996) [hereinafter CRISIS Report] (referring to "the ease with which personal
telephone calls can be tapped, especially those carried on cellular or cordless telephone calls").
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456-57 (1928) ("Small wires were inserted along
the ordinary telephone wires from the residences . . . and those leading from the chief office.
The insertions ... were made in the basement of the large office building. The taps from house
lines were made in the streets near the houses.").
154. CRISIS Report, supra note 153, at 67 (noting the demand for encryption in the wake of
publicity about intercepted cellular telephone calls).
155. For discussion of the general importance of electronic surveillance in the 1950s and
1960s, see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60-62 (1967); id. at 124 ("[E]lectronic surveillance is:
the single most valuable weapon in law enforcement's fight against organized crime." (Appendix
to White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)).
156. See CRISIS Report, supra note 153, at 113-215 (reviewing federal attempts to control
encryption technology); Freiwald, supra note 86, at 975-82 (discussing federal attempts to con-
trol telephone technology in 1994 and 1995).
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becoming more available. 157 On the other hand, electronic communi-
cations were becoming less "tappable." 158
A. Crippled Encryption
The ability to tap electronic communications is distinct from having
the ability to understand them. Encryption obviously could frustrate
wiretaps because even after the police intercept the electronic signals,
the meaning of the message would be inaccessible. 159 Indeed, modern
encryption is strong enough that it is possible that properly designed
encryption is unbreakable. 160
Suppose the government banned ordinary encryption and required
that all encryption contain a law enforcement "back door" that would
allow the government to obtain the unencrypted plain text of commu-
nications without the cooperation or knowledge of the user. 161 That
is, even though the encryption would provide confidentiality against
most people, the government would be able to bypass that protection
and read or understand the message. The main feature of proposals
157. In 1995, FBI Director Louis Freeh told Congress that, "unless the issue of encryption is
resolved soon, criminal conversations over the telephone and other communications devices will
become indecipherable." CRISIS Report, supra note 153, at 91.
158. Freiwald, supra note 86, at 975 (noting that in 1994, the FBI was "[cloncerned that the
use of call forwarding, cellular telephones and new digital communications technologies gener-
ally presented technological impediments to law enforcement agents' ability to wiretap" (foot-
notes omitted)).
159. To some extent, the ease with which over-the-air electronic communications like cordless
and cellular telephone calls can be intercepted may have stimulated demand for encryption.
CRISIS Report, supra note 153, at 67. The Board stated:
The impetus for thinking seriously about security is usually an event that is widely pub-
licized and significant in impact. An example ... is the recent demand for encryption
of cellular telephone communications. In the past several years, the public has been
made aware of a number of instances in which traffic carried over cellular telephones
was monitored by unauthorized parties. (footnotes omitted).
Id.
160. Even if any particular message is practical to decrypt, encryption as a general practice
might still sharply decrease the utility of wiretapping. On the other hand, encryption only oper-
ates over the transmission channel. Whether the message is oral, as over telephones, or written,
as with e-mail or faxes, the message necessarily begins and ends as plain text (i.e., in unencrypted
form).
161. In 1993, the government actually introduced government-designed encryption aimed at
ensuring law enforcement access to the contents of encrypted communications, but on a volun-
tary rather than mandatory basis. See CRISIS Report, supra note 153, at 167-215. The basic
idea was that the encryption would provide "very strong cryptographic confidentiality ... for
users against unauthorized third parties, but no confidentiality at all against third parties who
have authorized exceptional access." Id. at 169; see id. at 170-75 (explaining "Clipper Chip"
proposal for telephone communications); id. at 176-77 (describing "Capstone/Fortezza" initia-
tive for data storage and communications).
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for crippled encryption was that the government would have access to
special keys that could unlock the encrypted communication.
162
Because such regulation does not look like a search or seizure, the
standard Fourth Amendment analysis of government-crippled encryp-
tion begins by asking "whether forcing individuals to disclose their
private keys to the government constitutes a search or seizure."
163
This approach has focused on the keys that "unlock" the encrypted
data. Is the obtaining of keys a search or seizure? Is the storing of the
keys a search or seizure? Would a key recovery system constitute a
search or seizure?
My precautions approach avoids these questions. Encryption is a
precaution that increases electronic communications privacy, just as
envelopes are a precaution that increases paper communications pri-
vacy. The question is not whether recoverable encryption is a search
or seizure, but whether government action to restrict encryption vio-
lates our right to take precautions. As one court stated,
Whether we are surveilled by our government, by criminals, or by
our neighbors, it is fair to say that never has our ability to shield our
affairs from prying eyes been at such a low ebb. The availability
and use of secure encryption may offer an opportunity to reclaim
some portion of the privacy we have lost. Government efforts to
control encryption thus may well implicate . . . the constitutional
rights of each of us as potential recipients of encryption's bounty.
164
Government attempts to cripple encryption clearly infringe our pre-
cautions rights for the same reasons that we have a right to be protec-
ted against unlawful searches of our communications.
B. Mandated Tappability
In response to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's complaint that
advanced telephone technologies would hinder law enforcement at-
tempts to intercept communications,
165 Congress enacted CALEA. 166
162. In this early proposal, each device has a unique serial number and unique encryption key.
The government would keep a copy of these serial numbers and keys, enabling it to identify and
decipher every message sent using them. The keys, however, would be split into two halves held
by different government entities or "escrow agents." Id. at 171 (Box 5-1, "Key Technical Attrib-
utes of the Clipper Initiative").
163. Wyman Berryessa, Escrowed Encryption Systems: Current Public Policy May Destroy
Valued Constitutional Protections, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 80 (1997). Froomkin, supra note
85, at 827 ("Is mandatory key escrow, which takes place without a warrant, a search and seizure?
If so, is it a reasonable warrantless search or seizure, or should a warrant be required?" (foot-
note omitted)).
164. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn by 192
F.3d 1308, 1309 (9th Cir. 1999).
165. The problems asserted by the FBI included the following: The growth of wireless systems
that could not always "accommodate multiple surveillances;" "increased competition in the tele-
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CALEA requires telecommunications service providers to be able to
provide law enforcement with the entire contents of a wiretapping tar-
get's communications, no matter what technology or service was in-
volved in the transmission. It also provides "call setup information,"
such as information about who is calling, who is being called, and
other information not directly related to the content of the
conversation. 167
Since CALEA's enactment, the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI), the Federal Communications Commission, and the telecommu-
nications industry have been in continual struggles to establish compli-
ance standards for CALEA's tappability requirements. 68 Currently,
the FBI is seeking to extend CALEA to a variety of other services,
including Internet telephony. 169
communications industry" that permitted people to use more than one service provider, "making
one-stop surveillance impossible;" "problems intercepting calls rerouted through call forwarding
services and the inability to identify the destination of [speed-dialed calls];" "trouble in covertly
isolating the communication stream associated with a particular target as multiplexed transmis-
sion technologies and fiber cables replaced the paired copper wires that traditionally had been
associated uniquely with each customer." James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the
Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH.
65, 89-90 (1997) (footnote omitted).
166. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub. L. No. 103-414,
108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000) and in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
167. 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000). This information is needed to identify the calls that law enforce-
ment wishes to intercept.
168. See Michael O'Neil & James X. Dempsey, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Threats to
Privacy and Civil Liberties and Concerns with Government Mandates on Industry, 12 DEPAUL
Bus. L.J. 97, 108 (1999/2000). Two commentators explained:
An industry technical standards body spent years developing standards for digital
switching equipment to accommodate law enforcement's need for continued ability to
perform court ordered wiretaps only to have the FBI reject the effort because it did not
contain additional capabilities the FBI had either disavowed or never mentioned at the
time the statute was drafted.
Id.; see also Lillian BeVier, The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994: A
Surprising Sequel to the Break Up of AT&T, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1114-15 (1999) ("Claiming
always to be acting according to CALEA's letter and spirit, the FBI has often overreached and
more often than not adopted an intransigent bargaining position.").
169. In early 2004, the Justice Department, the FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion jointly petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to impose the CALEA
requirements on Internet voice and broadband access providers. See Joint Petition for Rulemak-
ing to Resolve Various Outstanding Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Communica-
tions Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, RM-10865 (filed Mar. 10, 2004), available at http://
www.askcalea.comldocs/20040310.calea.jper.pdf. The FCC then issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to solicit public comment on the DOJ/FBI petition, and issued a proposed rule.
Communication Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,976 (Sept. 23, 2004) (to
be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts 22, 24, 26). In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC tenta-
tively concluded that CALEA should be applied to all facilities-based providers of broadband
Internet access service, "including wireline, cable modem, satellite, wireless, broadband access
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CALEA in effect mandates that telecommunications be designed to
facilitate government surveillance. This initiative illustrates my sec-
ond normative argument against government interference with pre-
cautions-the concern that government will distort the normal
development of technological privacy precautions. Under CALEA,
''carriers must take steps to ensure that the broad technological trends
in the industry do not eliminate law enforcement access to communi-
cations of targeted individuals." 170 CALEA therefore affects all of
the privacy precautions associated with new and future telephony
technologies. For instance, carriers subject to CALEA cannot provide
carrier-based encryption services without assuring that law enforce-
ment can decrypt the communications. 171 Users can still encrypt their
own communications, but one of the most natural points for embed-
ding privacy precautions-the phone companies themselves-was
made less attractive from a privacy standpoint because of CALEA's
"tappability" requirement.
CALEA also illustrates a longer-term practical danger with serious
privacy implications: "[U]se of the law's coercive powers to order tele-
communications providers to devise technological solutions to law en-
forcement's emerging technology-generated problems and in its
insertion of the government into the design of the nation's telecom-
munications infrastructure.' 172 A company that develops a CALEA-
compliant protocol or product may do so on its own, or at the behest
of the government. 173 A pervasive government role in technology de-
velopment and implementation may make it impossible even to distin-
guish private from government interferences with precautions.
The privacy precautions associated with "digital telephony" were
unintentional in the sense that the telephone companies did not in-
tend to frustrate government surveillance. They were, however, pri-
vacy precautions nonetheless, and like the phone booth doors in Katz,
might have become part of our societal privacy expectations. If the
government wishes to infringe our right to use these precautions, it
should face significant constitutional scrutiny.
via powerline companies," and also to "managed" or "mediated" voice over Internet protocol
(VoIP services). Id. at 59,678.
170. See Dempsey, supra note 165, at 90.
171. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(3) (2000) ("A telecommunications carrier shall not be responsible
for decrypting, or ensuring the government's ability to decrypt, any communication encrypted by
a subscriber or customer, unless the encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier pos-
sesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication.").
172. BeVier, supra note 168, at 1072.
173. For instance, Cisco Systems, Inc. published a proposal for CALEA-friendly routers. See
Declan McCullagh, New Spy Tools-for Good or Evil?, CNET News.com (Apr. 21, 2003), avail-
able at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-9975 9 0.html.
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C. How to Decide Whether the Precautions Right
Has Been Violated
For two reasons, the precautions cluster-right should be protected
by a version of strict scrutiny. These reasons are that government ac-
tions must be open and that laws and regulations must be able to with-
stand challenges due to the vulnerability of the Fourth Amendment's
protections. Mandated tappability illustrates how the analysis might
work.
First, any such government action must be open and public, other-
wise, there is too great a risk that the public will be unaware that the
government has manipulated the social environment, or even if they
are aware, how it had been manipulated.174 That is, even if the gov-
ernment publicly announced that it would randomly conduct surveil-
lance, the public would not necessarily know what kinds of
surveillance were being used. It should be unconstitutional for the
government to make, or attempt to make, secret arrangements with
telephone companies, Internet Service Providers, or equipment ven-
dors that interfere with precautions. 175 Moreover, absent a clear pub-
lic statement, judicial review of such interferences would be
difficult. 176 Government may only interfere with precautions via con-
174. The obvious analogy is to covert surveillance. In the early 1950s, Americans held contra-
dictory views about electronic surveillance:
On the one hand, they feared that eavesdroppers were using increasingly sophisticated
electronic tools to violate their privacy and record their every move and conversation.
On the other hand, they considered tales of such surveillance to be the overblown prod-
uct of paranoia. The public did not know whether to believe law enforcement's claim
that if it was using electronic surveillance at all it was for a good cause and strictly
limited.
Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 9, 10 (2004) (citing SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 3-4 (photo. reprint 1979)
(1959)).
175. As Freiwald explains, government agents often conducted illegal electronic surveillance
"with the cooperation of local phone companies, who conspired with agents to keep surveillance
secret in order to maintain public confidence in the telephone networks." Id. at 12 (footnote
omitted).
176. One might draw an analogy to First Amendment doctrines shaped by concerns about
self-censorship. Licensing schemes for speech or tools of speech like news racks may be tested
on their face; they must articulate "narrow, objective, and definite" licensing standards for offi-
cials to follow; and they must contain procedural safeguards to limit officials' strategic use of
discretion. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756-59 (1988). Without
clear standards, "post hoc rationalizations by the licensing official and the use of shifting or
illegitimate criteria are far too easy." Id. at 758.
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gressional enactments or publicly noticed administrative proceedings
with significant accountability provisions.
177
Second, it should be possible to challenge such laws or regulations,
subject to the familiar strict scrutiny test, which demands a "compel-
ling" government interest and that the restriction must be the least
restrictive alternative. The stringency of this test is justified based on
the need for "Fourth Amendment prophylaxis" 178 to secure the funda-
mental right conferred by the Fourth Amendment.
Mandated tappability provides an example of how the analysis
might work. CALEA might fail the requirement that government in-
terference with precautions must be open and public. Although
CALEA is a public law and contains some public accountability
mechanisms, its "safe harbor" standards are developed by industry
with considerable FBI input.179 The overall accountability of CALEA
implementation is opaque to outsiders.
Notably, CALEA independently might fail the strict scrutiny
test. While a law enforcement or national security interest would
certainly be asserted in favor of restricting precautions, it is im-
possible to say whether the government could empirically estab-
lish the interest. The government first would have to establish
the value of electronic surveillance as a law enforcement tool,
1 80
177. See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 165, at 102-04 (discussing the need for accountability in
CALEA implementation); Slobogin, supra note 82, at 297 (discussing notice for public video
surveillance).
178. Prophylaxis, in this context, means overprotecting a constitutional right or value because
of its expected vulnerability. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) (explain-
ing that First Amendment doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth apply even if the complainant
did not engage in conduct protected by the First Amendment, because "[t]hese freedoms are
delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"); Brian Landsberg, Safe-
guarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925,
926-27 (1999) (defining "prophylactic rules" as "those risk-avoidance rules that are not directly
sanctioned or required by the Constitution, but that are adopted to ensure that the government
follows constitutionally sanctioned or required rules" and "directed against the risk of noncom-
pliance with a constitutional norm" (footnote omitted)); David Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophy-
lactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988) (discussing First Amendment prophylaxis and
suggesting that prophylactic rules "are a central and necessary feature of constitutional law").
179. Dempsey, supra note 165, at 96 (arguing that "the FBI's participation went beyond the
consultation intended by Congress and instead amounted to an effort to dominate the standards
process and dictate specific surveillance features").
180. As Professor BeVier has argued,
[o]ne would need more factual support than ... repeated assertions that it is theoreti-
cally useful in thwarting terrorists, kidnappers, and organized criminals. One would
need to know such things as the cost of each tap in terms of law enforcement resources,
the opportunity costs of using wiretapping instead of devoting the same resources to
other crime fighting techniques, how many (and what kinds) of crimes were actually
prevented, detected, or proven by wiretaps, and how many of those would (probably)
have gone unprevented, undetected, or unproven without wiretaps.
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and then establish the value of CALEA in maintaining tappabil-
ity.181
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that we have a constitutional right to take
privacy precautions. Privacy precautions are important for two rea-
sons. First, for better or worse, the Supreme Court has made precau-
tions significant to the judicial determination of whether our privacy
expectations are reasonable, or even exist. Our Fourth Amendment
privacy rights therefore depend on the variety of precautionary tech-
niques-both physical and social-that we use to produce privacy in
everyday life. Second, Fourth Amendment privacy turns on social
"understandings" that "must have a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment" 82 and "are in large part reflections of laws that trans-
late into rules the customs and values of the past and present. ' 183
Precautions are a central part of the social system of privacy. One
might say that precautions are essential to the language of privacy: We
use precautions to express our desire for privacy and we expect others
to respect those precautions. Accordingly, our precautionary behav-
ior is an integral part of our social "understandings," and as such they
should be protected against undue government interference.
BeVier, supra note 168, at 1113.
181. Id. at 1112-13 (noting that "CALEA practically guarantees that either too few or too
many resources will be devoted to actually maintaining wiretap capability"); id. at 1113-14
("CALEA is an invitation to allocational inefficiency" because "a substantial portion of the costs
of maintaining its technological capability are externalized by the FBI to the telecommunications
industry .... in disregard of one of economics' most basic insights" (footnote omitted)). Profes-
sor BeVier further argued that
the FBI, which is the agency that ought to have the most incentive to measure costs and
benefits accurately-to minimize the costs, maximize the benefits, and stop expending
resources when costs exceed benefits-instead will have no real way even to know the
costs. It will be motivated to externalize (and thus hide) as many of the costs as possi-
ble and to exaggerate the benefits.
Id. at 1114 (footnote omitted). Whether CALEA is the least restrictive alternative for furthering
the government's law enforcement interest is far beyond the scope of this Article.
182. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
183. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. Rakas, 439
U.S. at 143-44 n.12 (finding that it is "merely tautological" to base legitimate expectations "pri-
marily on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases").
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